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Preface and Acknowledgments

In 1945 few grasped the extent of the destruction of Eastern European Jews and their civilization, and the implications of this loss for
the region. Among the ﬁrst who mourned the loss were the Jewish
survivors and eyewitnesses, as illustrated by the poem “Untitled 1”
of the January 1945 Novyi mir cycle by the Russian Jewish poet Ilya
Ehrenburg:
I used to live in cities grand
And love the company of the living,
But now I must dig up graves . . .
In ﬁelds and valleys of oblivion
I speak for the dead. We shall rise,
Rattling our bones—we’ll go—there,
Where cities, battered but still alive,
Mix bread and perfumes in the air.
Blow out the candles. Drop all the ﬂags.
We’ve come to you, not we—but graves.
(Translation copyright © 2011 Maxim D. Shrayer)

The Holocaust has become the European paradigm of lieu de
mémoire and the universal icon of evil. Some have claimed the Holocaust an international paradigm of human rights. These developments
have evolved in different directions, creating on the one hand greater
understanding of the impact of the Holocaust, and on the other, poor
analogies and competing narratives of martyrdom. In Europe, despite
the establishment of the International Day of Holocaust Remembrance (27 January), the memory of the Holocaust still creates tensions
ix
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between the West and Europe’s postcommunist countries. In the latter, memories of the Gulag and reluctance to come to terms with the
dark wartime past, particularly as it relates to local Jewish communities, play a signiﬁcant role in the ways the Holocaust is remembered.
This book aims to capture the reception and interpretation of the
Holocaust in all the postcommunist countries. It examines the various
stages, motivations, and nature of this dynamic process. Even as this
book was being completed, the postcommunist region witnessed new
developments in the memorialization of the Holocaust. For example,
in Skopje, Macedonia, the Balkan Holocaust Museum opened, and
in Poland a new debate erupted over Jan Tomasz Gross’s latest book,
Golden Harvest. This volume records all the important developments
through the two decades since the collapse of communism and, we
hope, it delineates the key aspects, commonalities, and divergences of
the memory of the Holocaust in the region.
We would like to express our appreciation to a number of institutions and individuals that enabled us to work on this project. JohnPaul Himka would like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council of Canada and the Center for Advanced Holocaust
Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Joanna
Beata Michlic is particularly grateful to Prof. Shulamit Reinharz of
the Hadassah Brandeis Institute, Brandeis University, for her support and to Prof. Yehuda Bauer for his beneﬁcial comments. We are
also deeply indebted to Mr. Sigmund Rolat, the Conference Claims
Commission, and the Holocaust Educational Trust for their generosity. We would like to thank all our contributors, and especially Omer
Bartov for his exhaustive afterword.
Finally, we would like to thank our editors at University of Nebraska
Press for their care, support, and interest in this project, and the anonymous readers for the press who offered an invaluable critique. Last
but not least, we would like to thank our families and friends for their
patience and support.

x
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john-paul himk a and joanna beata michlic

Introduction

Engaging with the “Dark Past”

In the last two decades the subject of memory has become a compelling preoccupation of sociologists, historians, public intellectuals, and artists. The French scholar Henry Rousso has pointed out
that “memory has become a value reﬂecting the spirit of our time.”1
We live in the era of memory and delayed remembering of traumatic
experiences, and it is accompanied by two interwoven developments—
the cultures of apology and of repentance. 2 Jeffrey Olick, an American scholar of public memory, has referred to this phenomenon as
an “increase of redress claims” and a “politics of victimisation and
regret.”3 The “politics of regret” has emerged simultaneously with
the rise of multiculturalism and the transformation, in the West, of
the meaning of the Holocaust from a crime empirically committed by
Germans, Austrians, and other Europeans against the Jews to a paradigm for innocent suffering and victimhood.4
A difﬁcult but important aspect of the study of memory is that of
“the dark past” of nations in relation to their ethnic, religious, and
national minorities—the ways in which nations recollect and rework
the memory of their “dark pasts” and how this memory shapes their
collective identities and the social identity of ethnic and national
minorities. Discussions about national identities cannot escape from
an orientation toward the past, especially the uncomfortable past,
which does not pass away.5 The memory of the Holocaust and the
Jewish past in postcommunist Eastern Europe ﬁts into this category
of empirical problems. It is an exceptionally interesting case for the
study of the painful process of coming to terms with “the dark past”
1
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on the one hand, and on the other hand, of getting the past wrong,
thus making both the past and present not only bearable but also
predominantly positive and “bright.” It demonstrates that in mainstream historical consciousness and public memory the painstakingly
“uncovered” accounts of the “dark” pasts are chieﬂy perceived in a
category of “too much truth” that can hardly be accepted on a larger
social scale. And it shows too that in public memory, remembering is
not necessarily about getting the past right, but rather about maintaining the positive collective self-image and soothing national myths.
Thus, “the dark past” is perceived as a spoiler.
The memory of the Holocaust and the Jewish past in postcommunist
Europe also has manifold practical implications for the development
of national cultures and international relationships in postcommunist
Europe, as well as for international relationships between the postcommunist countries and Israel and the Jewish diaspora, and between
the postcommunist countries and the United States.
We had each been working on the problematic memory of the
dark past when we decided to put together this volume. Joanna had
already coedited a book with Antony Polonsky about the debates over
the massacre of Jews at Jedwabne on 10 July 1940 in Poland and had
just ﬁnished her monograph Poland’s Threatening Other, which dealt
with Polish images of Jews from the 1880s until the early twenty-ﬁrst
century.6 John-Paul was near the beginning of a research project on
Ukrainians and the Holocaust in history and memory and was working out some of his ideas about Ukrainian Holocaust memory at conferences. We realized that we were working on problems that exhibited
many striking similarities. We also read with interest the work of other
scholars on how the Holocaust was being remembered (or forgotten)
in the Central and Eastern European countries making the transition
out of communism. It would be very fruitful, we thought, to bring
together a collection of interpretive surveys of the struggle with the
memory of the Shoah in every postcommunist country in Europe,
addressing a wide array of developments throughout the region.
The Memory of the Dark Past in West and East

The cohesiveness of the collection is based upon a certain unity of historical experience in postcommunist Europe. In Western Europe and
2
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North America, the memory of the destruction of European Jewry
has been alive since the late 1960s and early 1970s. There is no need
to recapitulate all the moments in the development of the memory of
the Holocaust in the noncommunist West, but they include the capture, trial, and execution of Adolph Eichmann (1960–62), the airing of
the television miniseries The Holocaust in the United States and Germany (1978–79), the release of the blockbuster ﬁlm Schindler’s List
directed by Steven Spielberg (1993), and the opening of the United
States Holocaust Memorial Museum in the center of Washington dc
(also 1993). In fact, during the thirty years preceding the collapse of
communism in Europe, the Holocaust had evolved in the West into
the most potent, easily recognizable, and ubiquitous symbol of mass
murder and genocide. It was regularly appropriated by groups other
than Jews to make points about their own sufferings. It became a
source of reﬂection for philosophers like Hannah Arendt, sociologists
like Zygmunt Bauman, and historians like Raul Hilberg.7 It brought
into question all the accomplishments of Western Enlightenment—
how did such great evil emerge from a civilization so proud of its
moral and intellectual achievements? The Holocaust came to occupy
a centerstage position in ethical thinking about the modern world. It
was to stand as an example of the dangerous consequences of racial
and ethnic prejudice and hatred: “Never again!”
Oddly, or perhaps not so oddly, this intense focus on the Holocaust
occurred in societies that were more removed from the actual historical event. No Holocaust occurred, of course, in the United States,
Canada, or Britain. The Jews of Nazi-occupied Western Europe, even
of Nazi Germany and Austria, were generally murdered outside Western Europe, in the death and concentrations camps in the East. Lucy
Dawidowicz’s widely used estimate of Jews killed in various countries
in the Final Solution shows that victims from countries that entered
the postwar era as capitalist numbered fewer than half a million; however, Jews killed in European countries that were communist after the
war totaled almost ﬁve and a half million.8
It was certainly easier to think about the Holocaust in places where
it was more abstract, though in Western Europe the Jewish victims
were not publicly acknowledged either during the two decades after
the war.9 But it was much harder to do so in societies where the mas3
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sive machinery of genocide had actually been let loose, taking not
only victims but also accomplices. The messiness of actual historical
experience made it difﬁcult to imagine clarity. For example, while the
West could more easily distinguish among neat categories of victims,
perpetrators, and bystanders, the East had difﬁculty making sense of
the tangled complexities—victims forced to act as perpetrators (Jewish Ordnungsdienst were the largest manpower component in many
ghetto roundups), perpetrators as rescuers (those who had the power
to kill also had the power to save), selﬂess rescuers who exceeded the
call of moral duty and rescuers who became perpetrators against their
Jewish charges, and bystanders who had no sidelines to ﬂee to.10
Another difference between the West and the East was the intensity of the experience of Nazi occupation. Occupied France, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and Italy did not experience anything like the terror that raged in occupied Poland, the Soviet Union, or Yugoslavia. In
the latter region, the Germans mass murdered intelligentsia, burned
innumerable villages to the ground, deported millions to Germany as
forced labor, starved over three million Soviet pows to death, and routinely shot large numbers of the population as hostages or suspected
resisters. For the West, clearly, the Holocaust, once it reentered memory in the late 1960s, stood out more boldly from the background of
wartime violence than it did in the East.11
The Dark Past in the Communist Era

This more diffuse suffering from the Nazi occupation allowed the
communist regimes—perhaps even induced the communist regimes,
since their motivations remain uncertain—to downplay the speciﬁcity of Jewish suffering during the war. That is, the regimes did not
acknowledge that the Jews as a nationality were singled out by the
Germans for total extermination. Although the Soviet Union, the
Eastern European satellite states, and Yugoslavia did not entirely prohibit discourse about the Holocaust, they mufﬂed it and dissolved it
into the narrative of how all the people of their state suffered from
the fascist invaders. In the communist interpretation of the Second
World War, there was no room for public mourning and empathy for
the dead Jews and the destroyed world of Eastern European Jewish
civilization with its various centers such as Vilnius, the “Jerusalem
4
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of the North”; Lublin, the “Jerusalem of the East”; and Sarajevo, the
“Jerusalem of the Balkans.” As a result, and also because of tight censorship of the press in these countries, there was insufﬁcient thrashing out of locals’ complicity in the Holocaust. True, former policemen
and camp guards in German service were arrested and sentenced to
years of exile or the death penalty, but these trials were not the subject of public discourse, nor were the ramiﬁcations of political and
social collaboration in the Holocaust articulated and incorporated
into historical consciousness and social memory.12 Also insufﬁciently
aired was the legacy of interwar and wartime anti-Semitism; in fact,
at various moments in postwar communism, the regimes themselves
manipulated and reemployed the old anti-Semitic attitudes and tropes
for their own purposes. Although, and indeed because, wartime collaborationist regimes—like those of Romania, Hungary, Slovakia,
and Croatia—were anathematized by the communists, anticommunist and nationalist intellectuals privately viewed these regimes with
less hostility, sometimes with favor. The same was true for wartime
nationalists in places like Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Lithuania.
At the same time, Jewish communities in the communist countries experienced more alienation from the surrounding society as a
result of their experience with the Holocaust in the ﬁrst place and the
absence of recognition of their special suffering in the second place.
Whatever they felt, it was not possible for them to articulate it outside the family and immediate community. Within the remaining
local Jewish communities, the Holocaust survivors acted as the chief
organizers of low-key Holocaust commemorations and, at the same
time, represented the only sympathetic audience for these commemorative events.13 In the spirit of bearing witness, they felt compelled
to write—in a censored press of limited circulation and for a numerically limited audience—about the lost vibrant Jewish world and its
destruction.
In 1994 the anthropologist Rubie S. Watson contended that the
socialist states failed to convince society of their interpretation of
the past, and as a result, alternative “underground memories” always
existed and were kept alive.14 This contention holds true with respect
to the public memory of the precommunist and communist pasts of
the majority group, understood in an ethnic sense. However, in the
5
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case of the troubling, painful relations with Jews and other minorities during the war, “underground memory” was not alive among the
majority groups, except for a few individuals, as chapters in this book
conﬁrm. In fact, as argued by Michael Steinlauf in a pioneering study
of the memory of the Holocaust in Poland, the ofﬁcial communist way
of dealing with the memory of the Holocaust reﬂected, ultimately, a
popular need.15 It was socially acceptable and accepted.
Only after the fall of communism did the deeply buried memories
of the Holocaust resurface among eyewitnesses who as children and
young adults had had a ﬁrsthand experience of the local killing ﬁelds
and who had after the war kept these troubling memories from disturbing their everyday conscience. But by the early twenty-ﬁrst century these individuals slowly began to speak out about the wartime
horrors that they witnessed, as oral history projects and interviews
conducted in the region in that period conﬁrm.16 Correspondingly,
Jewish survivors, who had previously drawn a veil of silence over
their wartime experiences and their Jewish background, have begun
to articulate their past traumas and trajectories of survival.
The Outburst of Competing and Discordant Memories

When communism collapsed in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in the
Soviet Union in 1991, coming to terms with the Holocaust was one
of the political, moral, and cultural challenges that encumbered postcommunist Europe’s “return” to Europe. If the citizens of the postcommunist bloc aspired to the new European values, then they were
obliged to adopt the thinking about the Holocaust that prevailed in
Stockholm and New York, London and Brussels. In the initial euphoria of the “end of history,” the difﬁculties with reconciling the two
Europes’ understanding of the Holocaust did not seem to loom large.
But as time passed, it became clearer that postcommunist Europe was
not ﬁnding it so easy to accept the Western model of the Holocaust; in
fact, there was considerable resistance, often taking on similar forms
in different countries.
In Eastern Europe, the late 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s
witnessed what the historian Padraic Kenney calls a “carnival of revolution.”17 Remarkably peaceful in Central Europe but violent in
the Balkans, the carnival was marked by an explosion of memories
6
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from both the precommunist and communist pasts. As a result, many
skeletons from national closets have been exposed to daylight for
the ﬁrst time since 1945. The restoration of memory has not been a
smooth, unifying, or uniﬁed process.18 And at present it is still undergoing many dynamic transformations of competing and discordant
remembering.
So far we can differentiate two major stages of the process of restoration of memory. This is central to understanding how the national
communities—the political and cultural elites as well as ordinary
members of societies—have related to, remembered, and commemorated the Holocaust throughout the postcommunist period. It is also
essential to understanding the continuities and discontinuities of the
major narratives about the Holocaust and Jews that emerged prior to
and during this time, and the continuing redesigning, refashioning,
and reconceptualizing of these narratives.
The ﬁrst phase, which occurred immediately after the fall of communism, took on an (ethno)nationalist form. A powerful dichotomy
of “we” the nation and “they” the communist regime was strongly
emphasized at the expense of a more nuanced representation of the
past. The “ethnic vision” of the past, excluding the memory of the
local Jewish communities and other minorities, was prevalent. Moreover, the memory of the Holocaust continued to be repressed in public
discourse, and defensive attitudes toward the difﬁcult past in relation
to the destruction of the Jews played a more signiﬁcant role in public discourse than the newly emerged narratives aiming at exposing
the dark past. At the same time, a new wave of recycled and modiﬁed nationalistic and anti-Semitic narratives about the Jews as perpetrators during the communist period (Judeocommunism) have also
(re)emerged. The theme of Judeocommunism, in its various versions,
is the key narrative in the repertoire of the right-wing ethnonationalist politicians, journalists, and historians in the Baltic states, Hungary, Romania, Poland, and Ukraine. It serves to justify and minimize
any wrongdoing against the Jews during the Holocaust and to reinforce the narrative of one’s own victimhood during World War II and
in the post-1945 communist period. A good illustration of the stillpotent nature of Judeocommunism is that even some Eastern European historians and public intellectuals, such as Krzysztof Jasiewicz,
7
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who had previously opposed the stereotype of Judeocommunism as a
false anti-Semitic construct, have changed their tune in the course of
the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century and have begun to advocate Judeocommunism as a historical fact. Such individuals reside not
only in their countries of origins but also in the West. As the chapters
in this book conﬁrm, commemorative sites such as the newly established museums of national suffering under communism in the Baltic
states and Hungary have evoked Judeocommunism in their presentations of the past.
Arrival of “Dark Pasts” in Eastern Europe

The second phase of restoration of memory gradually crystallized
by the late 1990s and the ﬁrst years of the new millennium. It can
be called progressive, pluralistic, and civic because it aims at endorsing the complex, painful memory of the Holocaust. The key characteristic of this phase is the increasing awareness that national history
is more complex than a black-and-white vision opposing the communist version of the past. During this phase, new information and
new interpretations of the past, previously ignored both under communism and in émigré circles, have entered public discourse. And it
is during this phase that the dark, discomforting past of the majority
nations’ treatment of Jewish communities during the Holocaust has
become a subject of historical awareness, history writing, artistic performances, and public discourse. The impetus to the development of
this phase springs from two different current cultural and political
factors that intersect. The ﬁrst is the emergence of the genuine culture of nostalgia for the multiethnic past in some sections of society,
accompanied by interests in “all things Jewish” and the emergence of
what the acclaimed writer Ruth Ellen Gruber has called “Virtual Jewish Culture.”19 On a smaller, local scale, this process has even led to
the emergence of “the self-proclaimed carriers of the lost East-European Jewish civilisation.”20 An example is Janusz Makuch, director of
the highly successful annual international Jewish festival in Kraków. 21
The second factor is the pragmatic realization that the Holocaust
has become the contemporary European entry ticket, as discerningly
observed by the late Tony Judt in Postwar.22 As a result, the countries
that already joined the European Union in May 2004 and some of
8
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those that are awaiting admission have discovered that it is far better
politically to commemorate the Holocaust than to ignore it and that
it is more proﬁtable commercially to celebrate the multiethnic past
than to deny it. Politicians of these countries recognize that endorsing multiculturalism is a means of gaining respectability and visible international status in the West. Therefore, their new, endorsed
reconceptualizations of Jews and the Holocaust tend to perceive “the
perished Jews as good citizens and Jewish survivors and their descendents living in the West as welcome visitors.”23 On occasion, however,
state ofﬁcials utter pronouncements that contradict the new stance on
Jews, as various speeches of Romanian and Baltic state representatives
have demonstrated.
Contemporary Poland best illustrates a postcommunist country
in which the second phase of restored memory has reached the most
sophisticated level, as demonstrated during and after the Jedwabne
debate, whereas Ukraine best illustrates a postcommunist country
in which the ﬁrst phase of restored memory still has the upper hand.
Only with great difﬁculty is the second civic phase trying to establish
itself in public discourse and history writing in Ukraine. As Anatolii
Podolsky, director of the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Research in
Kyiv, sharply summarizes, “remembrance culture has reached a dead
end,” since there is “no desire to accept the ‘other’ as well.”24
Looking at the discourse about the Holocaust in most postcommunist countries, one is inclined to argue that all still await their respective “Jedwabne debates.” Such a debate would place the Holocaust and
the most difﬁcult aspects of the relations with the Jewish minority
at the center of public discourse and would also pose salient questions about a contemporary national identity and the status of various ethnic and national minorities in the past and present. “Jedwabne
debates” are necessary triggers of national conversations about the
present and future of society, “who we are,” “who we want to be,” and
“how we relate to the ‘Other.’” Yet they do not necessarily make the
nation tell its past anew. In Poland of the post-Jedwabne era, groups
of politicians, historians, public intellectuals, journalists, artists, and
society at large are clearly split in how they understand and evaluate
the dark aspects of Polish relations with the Jews during the Holocaust. The version of the dark past still acceptable for a broader pub9
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lic claims that only a small minority of Polish society did wrong to the
Jews. And social and cultural resistance to integrating the painful dark
past into public memory and popular historical consciousness continues, despite impressive historical research by Polish historians in
Poland and abroad and fact-based sophisticated Holocaust educational
programs implemented in Polish high schools after 2000. This resistance indicates, then, that the split over the dark past could become
a ﬁxed landmark of the process of memorialization of Jews and the
Holocaust in Poland as well as in other postcommunist countries.
Moreover, we can differentiate three key dimensions recurring in
the landscape of memory of Jews and the Holocaust: remembering
to remember, remembering to beneﬁt, and remembering to forget.
Remembering to remember is a process that underscores the void left
after the genocide of local Jewish communities. The intention is to
mourn, to commemorate the loss, and to come to terms with the dark
aspects of relations with the Jewish minority by making this past an
integral part of national history, historical consciousness, and public
memory. The advocates of this dimension insist on not only integrating the history of Jews and other ethnic and national minorities into
national history but also treating the Jews and members of other ethnic and cultural minorities as members of the nation in a civic sense.
On a cultural level, their major goal is to create both a “community of
identiﬁcation” with and an empathic memory for the Other. And thus
they are engaged in building a forward-looking, open, and inclusive
society based on the civic model of national belonging and a respect
for multiculturalism and for humanitarian values.
In remembering to beneﬁt, the key intention behind recalling and
commemorating the Jews and the Holocaust is to achieve tangible
goals on the individual, regional, and national level. Here the focus
is not so much on the past per se or on an identiﬁcation with and
empathic memory for the Other, but rather on utilizing the past in
the pursuit of tangible beneﬁts such as an elevated status and respectability in the international arena. With regard to the history of the
Jews in their nation, they emphasize that the Jewish minority has long
been present and that the descendents of this minority living abroad
are today welcome to become part of and to invest in the new postcommunist entity. They posit that Israeli and Western Diaspora Jews
10
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should view the country of their ancestors with a completely fresh
eye. They insist on treating the present moment in history as a “zero
point” in forging new and mutually beneﬁcial relationships with the
Jews in the West and in Israel. Though they acknowledge the dark
past in the history of their nation, for them that past is a completely
closed chapter on which one should not dwell, but instead look to the
future. In the name of this “bright” future, they claim it is better to
concentrate on those chapters in the history of the majority nation’s
relations with the Jews that cast a good light, rather than on the dark
history of anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.
In remembering to forget, the dark past is seen as an unjust insult
on collective history, memory, and identity. 25 This perception provokes an upsurge of anti-Jewish prejudices expressed either overtly
or covertly. Here, the interest in the Jewish past and the Holocaust is
greeted with tension and is disdainfully referred to as “an imported
fashion for Jews.” The advocates of “remembering to forget” view the
painful dark past as an unjust insult on national history and memory
and as a threat to the nation’s identity and future, and therefore they
attack advocates of “remembering to remember.” In “remembering
to forget,” the archeology of the dark and uncomfortable past provokes an upsurge of old anti-Jewish prejudices and stereotypes, carefully modiﬁed and repackaged to suit particular current political and
social situations, and depending on the particular disseminators, the
new/old anti-Jewish messages are delivered either overtly or covertly.
What remains certain is that by closely watching the developments
of restored memory in postcommunist countries, especially contemporary encounters with the Holocaust, we can learn a great deal about
the dynamics of public (collective) memory and national identity in
the region. We learn the dynamics of the reconceptualization of the
Jewish past and the Holocaust and the limits of recognition and integration of the dark past by broad, multigenerational sections of postcommunist societies.
The chapters in this book also conﬁrm that the process of digging out and uncovering the “dark past” has raised fears of “critical (national) history” because it is a rather novel approach to history
writing in Eastern Europe. Looking at the ways the dark past is integrated or not integrated illuminates the legacy of the formerly domIntroduction
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inant model of history writing, namely the “monumental (national)
history” that underscores the “positive past” and its “heroes,” and the
contemporary tensions between the “monumental history” and “critical history” models. We learn from these tensions how professional
historians approach the problem of historical truth, and how they are
being constrained, as members of a particular national community,
by fears of so-called negative nationalism.
About This Book

Chapters are ordered alphabetically by country, representing every
postcommunist country except Montenegro and Kosovo, which are
discussed brieﬂy in the article on Serbia. This is not a collection of
conference or workshop papers, although early drafts of some of the
papers were presented at meetings of the American Association for the
Advancement of Slavic Studies.
The relative unity of the situation of the postcommunist reception of the Holocaust contributes to the cohesiveness of this volume.
Even so, we established a chapter structure for each contribution to
follow, making it easy for readers to compare particular themes across
countries. We asked contributors to provide a historical introduction
that would brieﬂy describe the general wartime situation and especially the relation of the majority nation to the Jews, including issues
of collaboration and rescue, and then brieﬂy discuss the memory of
the Holocaust under communism. Main topics of lieux de mémoire to
be covered are the memory of the Holocaust and “high politics”26 and
public debates over the event since 1989, the Holocaust in the educational system and scholarship, the Holocaust in various branches of
culture (literature, cinema, music, theater), grassroots memorialization projects and commemorative sites, narratives of overseas diasporas, the thinking and activities of the Jewish communities of these
countries, and Holocaust negationism and anti-Semitism. In the case
of Hungary, we requested contributions from two authors, each with
a different expertise.
Many of our contributors have roots in the countries about which
they write and belong to the younger generations of scholars. Their
age reﬂects the fact that the unbiased study of the Holocaust in Eastern Europe and its memory, free of the earlier hegemonic commu12
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nist narratives, is itself very young. These scholars do not shy away
from writing frankly about emotionally charged and sensitive topics
pertaining to national identity and the dark past. As editors, we had
meaningful and enlightening discussions with our contributors and
learned a great deal about the dynamics of the memory of the Holocaust in different countries of the region, but at the same time we cannot take responsibility for their particular approaches, interpretations,
and arguments. This volume presents a variety of interdisciplinary
approaches to the subject within a structured framework of inquiry.
Despite a growing body of literature dealing with the memory of
the Holocaust, previous scholarly works on the topic have had certain
shortcomings. Monographs have tended to look at a particular case
and focus on ofﬁcial or public memory, while collections have presented an array of articles different in content, style, and methodology. Our collectively authored book, however, aims to overcome the
weaknesses of both monographs and collections, and is original in
its emphasis on the comparative perspective, its range of cases under
discussion, and its analysis of the same speciﬁc themes in each case.
Our book illustrates the common processes at play and the reasons
why investigation of the role of local elements in the wartime abandonment, mistreatment, and mass murder of the Jews has proceeded
so unevenly, and why memory of this painful past constitutes a continuing challenge difﬁcult to overcome. The concluding chapter by
Omer Bartov brings the recurrent themes into sharp perspective.
The main object of our book, having been partially inspired by
István Rév’s important study Retroactive Justice, is the remake of the
Holocaust and Jews in political, cultural, and socials realms in postcommunist countries since the fall of communism. The book focuses
on the trajectories of this remake in light of the legacy of the dark
past in relation to Jews; the earlier precommunist memories of Jews
and communist memory (amnesia) of the dark past; current Western
expectations and requirements for a full participation in European
institutions, particularly the European Union; and cultural nostalgia,
or its absence, for the multiethnic past. We concentrate on how this
remake interplays with postcommunist discourse about national identity, democracy, the culture of pluralism, and civil, inclusive societies.
This book is intended as a reference for scholars and students of
Introduction
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the Holocaust, of Eastern European history, politics, and culture, of
modern Jewish history, and of the sociology of memory.
We consider our book a potential departure point for comparative
analysis of the ways in which memories of “the dark pasts” shape discourses on democracy and national identity in Eastern Europe and
elsewhere. Although memories of South America’s violent past have
become the subject of intense inquiries, incorporating Latin America
into the analysis is beyond the scope of the present study. Nor does
our book directly discuss the (potential) encounters between current
Western intellectual discourses and interpretations of the Holocaust
presented by scholars such as Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen,
Michael Rothberg, or Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, and discussions
about the Holocaust generated in postcommunist Europe. 27 The ways
in which Western thought inﬂuences postcommunist thinking about
the Holocaust and the ways in which local traditions embedded in history and in the bestowed heritage dominate, and the interplay between
the two, are a set of topics that deserves a separate study. Nor does this
book compare Western and Eastern European trajectories of coming
to terms with the dark past. We recognize that a study examining in
systematic fashion Western and Eastern European models of emergence from postwar amnesia concerning the fate of Jews during the
Second World War in a broader historical context over a longue durée
would be of great importance because it would illuminate differences
and commonalities between Western and postcommunist Europe.
Since every book has its physical limits, we also had to abstain from
a direct and systematic analysis of recent pan-European initiatives to
ﬁght anti-Semitism and commemorate the Holocaust through various
committees and organizations like the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe, the
EU-funded Agency for Fundamental Rights, and the Task Force for
International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance,
and Research (itf). But chapters in our book do touch upon the impact
of transnational EU agendas on speciﬁc modes of remembrance in
Eastern Europe, such as the increased interest in rescuers of Jews,
which is especially pronounced in Albania and Poland, and attitudes
toward Holocaust denial prior to the EU’s legislation of 2008 penalizing Holocaust denial.
14
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Finally, our book does not discuss contemporary encounters of
Eastern Europeans with Israelis and Jews of the Western Diaspora and
how these encounters inﬂuence these groups’ memory of the Holocaust and the different roles the Holocaust plays in shaping contemporary Israeli identity. There is no doubt, as several chapters in this
book show, that political transformation triggered a revival of Jewish
life in Eastern Europe and that today the remaining, mostly numerically insigniﬁcant Jewish communities of the region have a more
assertive sense of Jewish identity and are highly engaged in memory
projects and commemorations of the Holocaust. However, their reactions to the trajectories of public debates about the dark past differ.
They range from silence, disappointment, and fear, especially pronounced in older generations of Holocaust survivors, to social activism in younger generations.
In Israel, where almost every week the main daily newspapers
Haaretz, Yediyot Ahronot, and Maariv still publish new wartime
accounts of survivors from Eastern Europe, an emphasis is being
placed on how the speciﬁc wartime events affect the lives of Israelis
as Jews and individual human beings.28 At the same time there is also
a realization of the disappearance of living witnesses to the dark past
and an accompanying sense of orphanhood in the next generations,
and the fragility of what Marianne Hirsch calls the postmemories of
the post-Holocaust generations.29
Memory: Between Past and Future

The wealth of archival sources that have become available since the
collapse of communism combined with new political, social, and cultural developments have provided crucial insight into the trajectories
of the memory of the Holocaust in postcommunist societies. In particular, this has facilitated a more nuanced and complex understanding of the continuities and discontinuities of the representations of the
Holocaust and the role it plays in contemporary national discourse in
the region.
By the middle of the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, most
of the postcommunist states proclaimed an annual Holocaust Remembrance Day to observe as a national event. Some states, including
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Estonia, and Poland chose the date 27
Introduction
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January, the anniversary of the Red Army’s liberation of the Auschwitz-Birkenau death camp complex, as their national Day of Holocaust Remembrance; other states, including Lithuania and Latvia,
chose a different date for the memorial day, one related to historical events in their own country.30 In general, decisions regarding how
and where the Holocaust in a particular locality should be remembered were determined not only by recognition of the event as worthy
of memorialization but also by practical and instrumental concerns.
The changes of governments during the postcommunist period have
revealed that ideology plays a crucial role in the attitudes toward commemorations of the Holocaust. Ideology affects the status of commemorations in the public sphere in both subtle and bold ways, as
various chapters in our book attest. For example, in 2002 in Hungary,
which today has the largest Jewish community in Eastern Europe, the
new right-wing government rushed to introduce a novel commemorative date, “Memorial Day of the Victims of Communism,” to compensate and balance the “Holocaust Memorial Day.”
The ofﬁcial commitment to educate about the Holocaust has not
yet been sufﬁciently incorporated into local textbooks or adequately
implemented in curricula. This is the situation despite the signing
by many postcommunist states of the Stockholm Declaration at the
International Forum on the Holocaust in 2000. And some countries,
including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Belarus, Moldova, Slovakia, and
Ukraine still lack sophisticated, unbiased educational programs about
the genocide of European Jewry.
Michael Schudson, an American sociologist, convincingly contends
that memory is essentially social “because it is located . . . in a whole
set of cultural practices through which people recognize a debt to
the past and in collectively created monuments and markers.”31 Social
memory always tells us more about the present than the past of the
collective. The variegated postcommunist memories of the Holocaust
conﬁrm the correctness of this observation. For example, in both the
Czech Republic and Albania, countries with different histories, cultures, economies, and demographic compositions, we ﬁnd a striking
commonality in the overarching theme of “innocence” pertaining to
the memory of the Holocaust. The belief in “collective innocence”
underpins the interpretation of collective behavior during the Sec16
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ond World War and the current self-evaluation of society. Thus, Albanians and Czechs believe that since they did not participate in the
Holocaust, they therefore constitute an example of a community of
tolerance and democracy that does not need to look critically at its
past. In Albania there is also a strong belief that Albanians and Jews
share a common history as persecuted nations throughout the modern
era. In popular historical consciousness in Slovenia, Slovenes cultivate
a notion of exceptionalism not dissimilar from the concept of “innocence” with regard to the responsibilities of locals for the genocide of
the tiny Slovene Jewish community.
In the Balkans, a region too often and unjustly excluded from comparative studies of Eastern European memories of the Holocaust, the
bloody wars in post-Yugoslavia in 1992–95 generated speciﬁc images
of the Holocaust that the nationalists on all sides of the conﬂict manipulated to advance their national, social, and political projects—most
importantly, legitimized statehood. In this strategy, the Holocaust
was completely divorced from its historical context and instead was
turned into an effective tool in the propaganda war that accompanied
the brutal conﬂict in the heart of Europe.
In contested territories such as Macedonia and Moldova, the
accounts of the fate of the Jews during the Holocaust have been manipulated in a similar fashion in order to fulﬁll the national aspirations
of conﬂicting parties. They typically present their versions of World
War II and the Holocaust so as to portray their opponent in an unfavorable light, especially by contrast to themselves. For example, Moldovans who oppose the claim of the Romanian character of Moldova
insist that the persecution of the Bessarabian Jews was introduced
by the forces of the “Romanian occupiers,” while the pro-Romanian
Moldovans often view any discourse about the local Holocaust as a
strategy to undermine what they believe is the true, Romanian identity of the majority population of Moldova.
The Dark Past and the Double Genocide Theory

The Holocaust has no doubt arrived in postcommunist countries, but
the temptation to tell the past in a comforting way, as Tony Judt correctly predicted, is persistent in the region.32 Perhaps out of this temptation “the double genocide theory,” or the symmetry between Nazi
Introduction
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and communist crimes, was born and is most pronounced in the Baltic states. This theory makes a powerful tool in the hands of local
right-wing ethnonationalists and might have a detrimental impact on
the process of coming to terms with the dark past in those countries. Ethnonationalists employ this theory to minimize the wartime
crimes against Jews and to undermine the discourse about legal, historical, and moral responsibilities for the Holocaust. In their eyes,
the Holocaust is a purely “exaggerated” historical event that basically
obfuscates the suffering of other people.33 To reinforce their negative evaluation of the Holocaust, the radical ethnonationalists skillfully employ the above-mentioned potent theme of Judeocommunism.
They also weave a refashioned theme of Israel as the present embodiment of the Nazi state into the narrative of what they consider to be
their own unacknowledged and forgotten suffering vis-à-vis the wellknown suffering of the Jews. Responsible criticisms of Israeli policies
are valid, but the comparisons of Israel to the Nazi state are perverse,
as noted most recently by Shlomo Avineri, a political scientist, Israeli
statesman, and public intellectual, himself a critic of speciﬁc policies
of the present Israeli government.34
Putting on the mantle of martyrdom and mixing it with antiSemitic themes of Judeocommunism and “Nazi Israel” in order to
undermine the memory of the Holocaust creates a highly volatile mixture that could have a lasting effect not only on the integration of the
dark past into mainstream historical consciousness but also on the
memory of the Second World War in general.
The Senate of the Czech Republic endorsed the theory of double
genocide in a resolution of 3 June 2008, and the European Parliament
passed a similar resolution on 2 April 2009. The latter declared 23
August, the date on which in 1939 the infamous Ribbentrop-Molotov
agreement was signed between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union,
as a date of remembrance of victims of both regimes. Yehuda Bauer,
the eminent Israeli historian of the Holocaust, protested against the
comparisons between Nazi Germany and the Soviet regime, arguing that “World War II was started by Nazi Germany, not the Soviet
Union, and the responsibility of the 35 million dead in Europe, 29 million of them non-Jews, is that of Nazi Germany, not Stalin. To commemorate victims equally is a distortion.”35 As several chapters in this
18
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book reveal, a minority of local public intellectuals also strongly protested this comparison. But perhaps one of the most adamant voices
against political calls for the Soviet Union’s crimes against Lithuania to be named an act of genocide is that of Lithuanian philosopher
Leonidas Donskis. In his article “The Inﬂation of Genocide,” published in June 2007 Donskis argues:
We are living in an era of not only monetary inﬂation, but also of the
inﬂation—hence devaluation—of concepts and values. . . . After all, we
cannot regard the history of all our civilisations as one ongoing crime
and one endless genocide of some group or other. Whitewashing a concept beneﬁts no one. . . . No matter how cruel the Soviet terror that was
visited upon the Baltic states, a large segment of Lithuanian, Latvian and
Estonian society, by going over to the other side, by becoming collaborators, was not only able to save itself, but also secure for itself successful careers in the administration of the occupying regime. This group
was able to wreak havoc on and settle scores with its own people, doing
so with impunity.36

We differentiate here between the manipulation of comparison in
order to downplay the signiﬁcance of the Holocaust, which is usually
embarked upon precisely as a way to distract from a dark past of collaboration in the murder of the Jews, and legitimate scholarly comparisons that explore the deep wounds of twentieth-century history.
Furthermore, our insistence in this volume on the importance of the
genocide of the Jews is not intended in any way to diminish empathy
for the suffering of others at the hands of the Nazis or of the Soviets
during these evil times. We agree with Michael Shaﬁr, whose brilliant analysis of the forms of postcommunist historical denial is cited
many times by the authors in this volume, that “for the trivialization
of the Holocaust to lose its largely East European prevalence, we . . .
might well stop and ask whether we do not sin ourselves in trivializing other genocides.” And:
Comparisons, to be sure—including comparisons in the social sciences—
may be a scientiﬁc instrument serving the purpose of widening the perspective of analysis. There is no reason why the Holocaust should not be
compared with the Gulag, were it only for the fact that they both undeniIntroduction
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ably belong to the genocide phenomena, and genocide studies, alas, are an
emerging discipline in our world. However, when the comparison is made
for the purpose of denying or belittling either of them, and/or for that
of obliterating that which is inherently unique to either the Holocaust or
to the Gulag, then one has ceased to look for similarities and has entered
the odious mineﬁeld of historic negation. Such endeavors have nothing in
common with science, “social” as they may still remain.37

The Future of the Dark Past

In Triumph and Trauma, Bernhard Giesen observes that today in the
West the Holocaust has acquired the position of “a free-ﬂoating myth
or a cultural icon of horror and inhumanity.”38 But in postcommunist
Eastern Europe, the approaches to the meanings of the Holocaust still
have a rather more speciﬁc local character, embedded in wartime history, though Western inﬂuences are also visible. Characteristically,
as many chapters in our book conﬁrm, an acceptance of new rituals
of remembering and commemorating the dark past usually provokes
counter-rituals, and the “critical history” writing about the dark past
provokes counter–“monumental history” writing. Remembering to
remember, remembering to beneﬁt, and remembering to forget—the
three dimensions of remembering Jews and the Holocaust—continue
to manifest themselves in different versions and with varied inﬂuence.
Thus, it is impossible to speak about a rupture between the past and
the present. Instead, one can observe a fusion of the past and the present that also produces modiﬁcations of traditional narratives designed
to suit current needs.
The multitude of approaches toward Jews and the Holocaust and
the painful dynamic of the dark past in postcommunist countries
suggest that cultural heritage and traditions exert enduring power
on national identity, memory, and professional history. On the other
hand, major selective transformations in the realm of national memory, identity, and history are possible under new global conditions,
Western/international demands and pressures, multiculturalism, and
nostalgia for a multiethnic past. What is therefore certain is that the
project of the integration of the memory of the Holocaust with all its
painful and uncomfortable aspects will require intense work on the
20
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part of more than one generation of scholars, public intellectuals, educators, and local enthusiasts in the region and its diasporas.
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